"I'M SORRY, I CAN'T ANSWER THAT":
POSITIVE SCHOLARSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATION PROCESS

Lori A. Ringhand
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution grants to the Senate the duty to
provide its "advice and consent" to the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices. Just how senators should exercise that duty, however,
is deeply contested. Much of the dispute about the Senate's role involves the appropriate scope of questions the senators should ask,
and what nominees should be expected to answer, at the confirmation hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee.' Opponents of
vigorous senatorial questioning argue that such questioning infringes
on the independence of the judiciary; proponents argue that the
nominees' failure to answer probing questions hinders the Senate's
constitutional obligation to meaningfully consent to nominations.
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel recently have jumped into this
dispute by proposing that Supreme Court nominees properly can be
expected to answer questions about how they would have voted in
cases the Supreme Court has already decided. This approach, they
argue, avoids inappropriately infringing on judicial independence
*

1

2

Lori A. Ringhand, Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
Thanks are owed to Barry Friedman, Jeffrey Segal, Georg Vanberg, and the participants at
the University of PennsylvaniaJournal of ConstitutionalLaw Positive Approaches to Constitutional Law and Theory Symposium for their thoughtful comments on an early draft of
this Article.
These two elements of the issue are not symmetrical. There is a certain formalistic consensus that senators can, as a separation of powers matter, ask whatever they want. The issue is whether nominees should be expected to answer and whether the refusal to do so
constitutes an appropriate basis for denying confirmation. See GEORGE L. WATSON &
JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS
158-59 (2005). But seeJohn M. Walker, Jr., Politics and the Confirmation Process: The Importance of Congressional Restraint in SafeguardingJudicialIndependence, 55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1,
11-12 (2005) (arguing that questioning about specific issues or cases harms the judicial
role by contributing to the appearance of the politicization of law).
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, QuestioningJustice: Law and Politics in JudicialConfirmation Hearings, YALE L.J. (THE POCKET PART),Jan. 2006, http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/
post.and-siegel.html.
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while enhancing the ability of the Senate to meaningfully consent to
nominations.
This Article engages positive legal scholarship to support Post and
Siegel's conclusion that objections to their proposal are not easilyjustified by the concerns about judicial independence on which they
purport to rest. In doing so, this Article examines the confirmation
hearing transcripts of the nine Justices who comprised the final
Rehnquist Court. I determine how often these nominees were willing
to provide opinions about previously decided Supreme Court cases,
for which cases they were willing to provide such opinions, and which
cases they refused to discuss, on the basis that doing so would compromise their judicial independence (or impartiality) in future cases.
I find that these nominees, in fact, provided opinions about many
previously decided Supreme Court cases, and that there was some
surprising variety in the cases on which the Justices, both as a group
and as individuals, would and would not opine. I also show that
much of this variation cannot be attributed to the distinction drawn
by the nominees themselves between the propriety of opining on "settled" versus "unsettled" cases. The actual practice of these recent
nominees thus supports Post and Siegel's conclusion that concerns
about the decision-making independence of the Justices, even taking
the nominees' own views of what that independence requires into account, do not appear to be what is animating objections to their proposal.
I then consider whether those objections are nonetheless justified
by concerns that adoption of the Post-Siegel proposal would compromise the institutional independence of the Supreme Court as a
court, by effectively conditioning confirmation on the nominees'
opinions about specific cases, thus giving the Senate undue influence
over a purportedly "co-equal" branch of government. Drawing on
both the actual practice of the Rehnquist Court nominees and existing legal and political science scholarship, I argue that these objections also are suspect, in three distinct ways. First, the actual practice
of the nominees is not supportable on that basis. Second, existing
political science scholarship shows us that adoption of the Post-Siegel
plan is unlikely, in any event, to increase the type of "politicization" of
the confirmation process that underlies this concern. Third, existing
positive legal scholarship seriously casts doubt on the very premise on
which the institutional independence objection rests. This scholarship also, however, suggests an alternative vision of judicial independence, one fully compatible with the Post-Siegel proposal, which
is itself both normatively desirable and grounded in a more realistic
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understanding of the role the Supreme Court actually plays in our
governing system.
I thus conclude that the Post-Siegel proposal, if accepted by senators and nominees, has the potential to bring some much needed realism and clarity to the Senate's role in the Supreme Court confirmation process, without posing a significant threat to either the
individual decision-making independence of Supreme Court Justices
or to the institutional independence of the Supreme Court.
II. THE EXISTING DEBATE AND THE POST-SIEGEL PROPOSAL
A. CurrentApproaches
Most scholars and commentators who have addressed the issue of
the appropriate scope of senatorial questioning of Supreme Court
nominees have embraced one of three general approaches to such
questioning. Advocates of the first, and most constrained, approach
argue that senators must limit their questioning solely to issues involving a nominee's "qualifications" or "character. '' Advocates of this
approach argue that questioning going beyond this, such as questions
involving a nominee's approach to constitutional interpretation, policy preferences, or specific legal opinions, threatens judicial independence.4 This perceived threat to judicial independence has two
aspects. First, such questions are believed to threaten the individual
decision-making independence of the future Justices by creating either an apparent or an actual pre-commitment to decide particular
3

Note that it is quite difficult to define in any absolute way exactly what the necessary
qualifications for a Supreme CourtJustice should be. SeeJudith Resnick, Changing Criteria
for JudgingJudges, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 889, 891 (1990) (noting, among other things, that
those lawyers who frequently address legal issues in publications may not be the ones best
suited for the bench). Advocates of this position, however, are relatively clear that they
are referring to a nominee's competence, experience, integrity, and temperament. See
WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 1, 72-76 (discussing the primary nominee qualifications
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and categorizing them as integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament);
Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1186-88, 1198-201 (1988)
[hereinafter Carter, The ConfirmationMess] (suggesting that a candidate's moral character
should be considered alongside his professional credentials and intellectual capacity in
the nomination process); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Valuesfor the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 927, 928 (1979) (acknowledging that
ethical impropriety or the lack of legal ability are accepted grounds for opposing a nomination).
See, e.g.,
Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess Revisited, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 962, 965 (1990)
[hereinafter Carter, The Confirmation Mess Revisited] (arguing that approving nominees
based on questions meant to elicit future voting patterns inappropriately establishes contemporary political judgments as settled constitutional law).
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cases particular ways. 5 This concern is the one raised most frequently
by the nominees themselves when they refuse to answer questions on
the grounds that doing so would hinder their ability to be impartial
when hearing future cases in which similar issues are raised (what I
have taken to calling "invoking the privilege to be non-responsive").
The second perceived threat to judicial independence posed by
such questions, at least as seen by proponents of the first approach, is
to the institutional independence of the Supreme Court itself. The
concern here is that if senators are permitted to ask questions about a
nominee's personal or political policy preferences, opinions about
specific legal issues, or preferred methods of constitutional interpretation, a nominee's agreement with the Senate's preferences in these
matters inevitably will become a precondition of the nominee's confirmation.6 This threatens judicial independence, these advocates argue, because it allows the Senate to use the confirmation process to
replicate its own policy preferences on the Supreme Court, thereby
interfering with the Court's ability, as a distinct branch of government, to independently determine constitutional meaning Consequently, advocates of this approach argue, senatorial questioning
must be severely restricted. s
5
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Id. But see Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings:
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REv. 913 (1983) (considering and rejecting this argument). See generally Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858
(1990) (examining the trend towards more active Senate participation in the selection of
the judiciary and the forms of questioning most likely to encourage democratic influence
over the Supreme Court).
Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 3, at 1193.
Carter, The Confirmation Mess Revisited, supra note 4, at 965. Professor Carter argues that
senatorial considerations of anything other than a nominee's qualifications and character
threaten the independence of the judiciary. Specifically, he argues that senatorial efforts
to question a nominee for the purpose of eliciting information about how the nominee
will vote in future cases risks "enshrining the politically expedient judgments of a given
era as fundamental constitutional law" and threatens the basic ability of the Court to do
its job. Id. He also rejects questions about a nominee's "judicial philosophy" on the
grounds, discussed below, that such questions are not illuminating in the abstract and
that they therefore serve merely as a proxy for questions about particular outcome or policy preferences. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 3, at 1190. See also Bruce Fien,
Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REv. 672, 673 (1989)
(arguing that the Senate is poorly equipped to engage in inquiries of a nominee's "judicial philosophy").
There seems to be notably less concern about the President's ability, particularly when
senatorial questioning is limited as suggested by advocates of this first approach, to do exactly the same thing. But see Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In
Search of ConstitutionalRoles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 556, 566 (1986) (arguing that the power of the President to engage in ideological screening of nominees
demands an assertive senatorial role in the process); Carol Rose, Judicial Selection and the
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A large middle group rejects this strict "qualifications and character only" limitation on senatorial questioning. This group argues that
the Senate's constitutional duty to provide advice and consent to Supreme Court appointments permits-and may even require-the
Senate to engage in a somewhat more probing examination of Supreme Court nominees. 9 Holders of this view do, however, agree in
part with the first group, in that they accept that asking nominees for
opinions about specific cases or legal issues does raise the concerns
about judicial independence noted above. They thus attempt to fashion a compromise of sorts, by arguing that senators should not ask
about a nominee's political preferences or seek answers about particular cases or specific legal questions, but that they can and should
examine a nominee's 'judicial philosophy" or overall approach to
constitutional interpretation.' 0
Advocates of this middle-ground approach believe it is best because it protects judicial independence and avoids the improper appearance of judicial bias, while also giving the senators the information necessary for them to fulfill their own constitutional duties. To
the extent that there is any current consensus on the appropriate
scope of senatorial questioning, it appears to lie here, and recent
nominees have been quizzed extensively about their opinions regarding constitutional interpretation, strict-constructionism, 'judicial activism," and the like.11
Scholars and commentators in the final group advocate for a
much broader range of senatorial questioning than that advocated by

Mask of Nonpartisanship,84 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 930 (1990) (suggesting that closer senatorial scrutiny of nominees is warranted where a President selects a candidate with close
ideological ties).
9
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LAWRENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).

See Steven H. Goldberg,

Puttingthe Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
175, 194 (2004) (contending that the ideological preferences of nominees should be
probed, but that this questioning should focus on long-term and systemic issues rather
than contentious issues of the moment); Martin H. Redish, Legal Realism and the Confirmation Process: A Comment on Professor Nagel's Thesis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 886, 888 (1990) (acknowledging that the Senate should be concerned with a nominee's ideological preferences to ensure the enforcement of countermajoritarian values); see also Walker, supra
note 1, at 10 (admitting that, at least in regards to Supreme Court nominees, senators
may have cause to inquire about a nominee's judicial philosophy).
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 9, at 200 ("Presidents and Senators should acknowledge
that there are varying respectable views about the Court and the Constitution, that it is
important to know a nominee's views, and that those views are not disqualifying unless
they are beyond the pale or held with such ferocity that they will override all considerations.").
WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 1, at 158-59.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

[Vol. 10:2

the first or second groups. Proponents of this approach endorse detailed and specific senatorial questioning of a Supreme Court nominee's opinions about precise legal issues or cases. 2 They dismiss
claims that such questions intrude on the Supreme Court's institutional independence by arguing that those claims cannot be reconciled with the Senate's textually unrestricted constitutional authority
to consent-or not-to Supreme Court appointments. 3 They also reject the argument offered by proponents of the middle group that
the Senate can get meaningful information by limiting its questions
to inquiries about the nominee's general approach to constitutional
philosophy or interpretation. 4 Nominees' comments regarding their
constitutional philosophies or preferred interpretive methodologies,
advocates of this approach argue, provide little information about
how the nominee will actually decide specific, concrete cases, a problem exacerbated by the fact that, when asked about methods of constitutional interpretation, most Supreme Court nominees say more or
less the same thing. 5 A mode of questioning that fails to enable sena12
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See, e.g., Lively, supra note 8 (arguing that aggressive senatorial engagement in the confirmation process is appropriate and necessary); Post & Siegel, supra note 2 (arguing that
senators should be able to ask Supreme Court nominees how they would have voted in
previously decided cases); Rees, supra note 5, at 967 (suggesting that the nominee practice of refusing to state specific views on constitutional questions be changed, because
those views are relevant to the confirmation votes of senators); Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988)
(supporting aggressive Senate questioning during the confirmation process to build public accountability).
Post & Siegel, supra note 2 (arguing that substantive questioning on constitutional issues
by senators during confirmation hearings is precisely the way Article II of the Constitution indicates such hearings should unfold).
Interestingly, this is a point on which advocates of the first approach, such as Stephen
Carter, and advocates of this third approach, such as Grover Rees, tend to agree. See
Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supra note 3, at 1190 (arguing that it can be difficult to assess a nominee's judicial philosophy in any meaningful way without referring to concrete
and specific cases); Rees, supra note 5, at 962-63 (noting thatJustice Harry Blackmun, the
author of Roe v. Wade, described himself in his confirmation hearings as a "strict constructionist").
Rees, supra note 5, at 962-63 (pointing out that most nominees to the Supreme Court
can be expected to employ very similar, and highly generalized, slogans and phrases regarding their judicial philosophies). This is consistent with my own research in this area.
In the course of a different project, my co-authors and I looked at the confirmation transcripts of each of the Justices of the last Rehnquist Natural Court. Among other things,
we culled from the transcripts all statements made by the nominees about originalism,
original intent, strict construction, the "living constitution," activism, and the use of
precedent, i.e., key words regarding their "judicial philosophies." As it turns out, the
nominees all made similar comments when asked about these things. Students asked to
do a blind ranking (meaning they did not know which justice made the statements) of
the nominees' relative commitment to the different interpretive methods, as evidenced in
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distinguish the probable jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia,
Day O'Connor, and John Paul Stevens, these critics argue, is
value. To advocates of this final approach, then, the middleposition is not so much a compromise as it is a capitulation.

B. The Post-Siegel Proposal
Robert Post and Reva Siegel's proposal fits into the last of the approaches articulated above. Post and Siegel posit that Supreme
Court nominees can and should be asked how they would have voted
in cases that the Supreme Court has already decided. 6 This type of
questioning, they argue, forces nominees to explain how their abstract interpretive preferences or constitutional philosophies manifest
themselves in concrete cases, thus providing the Senate with crucial
information about the constitutional consequences of the pending
confirmation. 7 Moreover, they argue that this type of questioning
does not threaten either aspect of judicial independence identified
above. Specifically, they claim that their proposal does not threaten
the impartiality of individual Justices because it does not go beyond
revelations made by the actual Justices who decided the prior casemany of whom may still be sitting on the Court and none of whom
are perceived therefore as incapable of fairly hearing future cases involving the topics they passed judgment on in previously decided
cases. 8 Nor, they claim, does answering such questions threaten the
institutional independence of the judiciary, because that independence itself is premised on the consent of the Senate to Supreme
Court appointments.' 9
Post and Siegel thus address each of the most frequently made arguments against a Supreme Court confirmation process in which
nominees are asked about and are expected to provide answers regarding their opinions of previously decided cases. They do not,
however, engage empirical or positive legal scholarship in doing so.20
The goal of this Article is to take that next step and explore how this

16
17
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the transcript excerpts, could not make consistent distinctions between the nominees. JasonJ. Czarnezki, William K Ford & Lori A. Ringhand, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008).
Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 38.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 45-46.
Post and Siegel note that senators do at times attempt to get this type of information, but
that they do so only hesitantly. Id. at 43.
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scholarship can enhance our evaluation of the Post-Siegel proposal.
As noted above, I do so in three ways: by examining the actual practice of recent Supreme Court nominees; by looking to existing political science research to consider the likely consequences of adopting
the Post-Siegel proposal; and by culling insights from existing positive
legal scholarship to consider reframing the debate about judicial independence itself.
III. ACTUAL PRACTICE AND THE DECISION-MAKING INDEPENDENCE OF
THE INDIVIDUALJUSTICES OBJECTION

To determine the extent to which Supreme Court nominees already provide the type of responses sought by the Post-Siegel proposal, I examined the Senate confirmation hearing transcripts of the
nine Justices who sat on the most recent Rehnquist Natural Court
(those Justices sitting from 1994 to 2005) .21 Coders identified all instances in which a Supreme Court case was named by a senator or by
the nominee.22 If the nominee in such instances provided a current
expression of opinion about the named case, the nominee's response
was coded based on whether the nominee expressed agreement with
the case, disagreement with the case, or a mixed/uncertain opinion
of the case. Those responses were then further coded to distinguish
cases in which nominees expressed only general agreement or disagreement from those in which the nominee offered a firm, unambiguous endorsement or rejection of the holding of the named case.
Instances in which a nominee specifically refused to provide a current
opinion about a named case on the basis that answering would be inappropriate because the issue presented was likely to come before the
Court and speaking to the issue would therefore create the appearance of bias or impropriety in those future cases (invoking the privilege to be non-responsive) also were coded. The coding thus captures all situations in which a nominee either provided an opinion

21

These Justices are the late ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Associate Justice confirmation transcript was not examined, nor was the second segment of Justice

Thomas's hearing (addressing accusations that Justice Thomas sexually harassed a former
employee).
22

This coding methodology does not, and does not purport to, capture all legal opinions
given by nominees at their confirmation hearings. Discussions of law not undertaken in
the context of a named case are not included here.
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about a previously decided Supreme Court case, or, alternatively, refused to do so for the reasons discussed by Post and Siegel.23
Table 1 below shows the cases on which the nominees as a group
most frequently gave general opinions, most frequently gave firm
opinions, and most frequently invoked the privilege to be nonresponsive (the number of times the indicated response was given by
a nominee is shown in parentheses):
TABLE 1
MOST FREQUENT RESPONSES: ALL NOMINEES

General Opinion Most
Frequently Given

Firm Opinion Most
Frequently Given

Privilege Most
Frequently Invoked

Brown (16)
Marbury (11)
Dred Scott (8)
Plessy (7)

Brown (11)
Marbury (8)
Dred Scott (7)
Eisenstadt (6)

Lochner (7)

Lochner (6)

Roe (34)
Marbury (8)
McCardle (7)
Rust (6)
Griswold (5)

Eisenstadt (6)

Plessy (6)

Casey (4)

Obviously, the Rehnquist Court nominees were willing to provide
even firm opinions about a great number of previously decided Supreme Court cases. To this extent, then, these nominees were already complying with the Post-Siegel proposal. They also, however,
invoked the privilege in numerous cases, and did so quite selectively:
that most of the nominees are willing to endorse Brown v. Board of
Education,24 and refuse to opine on Roe v. Wade,2' will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the confirmation process.

23

24

Note that this is not exactly the same information sought under the Post-Siegel approach.
Post and Siegel frame their inquiry as one of how the nominee would have voted on previously decided cases. Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 38. The responses set forth below,
particularly in relation to the nominees' statements of general agreement or disagreement with named cases, are in some instances a bit less precise than that. For example, in
some of the situations reflected below, the nominee expressed an opinion of the outcome
in a named case without elaborating (or being asked to elaborate) on the legal reasoning
used by the Court to reach that outcome. The responses counted below thus may be in
some instances less informative than would be the responses sought by Post and Siegel.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

25

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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At first glance, in fact, the nominees' actual practices appear to be
consistent with the statement they themselves tend to make when invoking the privilege: that they will discuss "settled" cases but are unwilling to discuss "unsettled" cases because such cases raise issues that
are likely to come before the Court in the future.26 This distinction
(assuming nominees can accurately guess what will and will not come
before the Court in the future) 27 could justify a distinction between
the nominees' treatment of settled and unsettled cases. If an issue is
in fact unlikely to be before the Court in the future, then the nominees' discussion of the issue poses little risk to his or her future impartiality in similar cases.
A closer look at the responses, however, complicates this. This is
most notable in regard to Marbury, which is in the somewhat odd position of coming in second in each of the response type categories delineated above. When asked about Marbury, Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer were willing to provide firm opinions about the
case. 28 Justice Scalia, however (much to the astonishment of Senator
Arlen Specter), felt that doing so would harm his ability to be impar-

26

Whether this distinction is itself defensible is discussed below. I conclude that it is not.

27

This assumption is itself questionable. While not captured by the above case-focused
data, there are several instances in the transcripts where the nominees readily opine on a
body of law they may consider "settled" that turns out not to be. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, both stated at their confirmation hearings that Congress was the appropriate body to enforce the limits of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause-an issue that was in fact revisited by the Rehnquist Court. Nomination of Antonin
Scalia to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong. 2 (1986) [hereinafter Scalia Transcript]; Nomination of
Clarence Thomas to Be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 102d Cong. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Transcript]. All citations to the Justices' transcripts are to the transcripts published by the United States Senate and made available on its webpage at http://www.Senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
oneitem andteasers/SupremeCourtNominationHearings.htm.
Moreover, is it
really inconceivable, in our post-9/11 world, that the Court could be asked to reexamine
cases such as Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and even
Korematsu v. United States, 321 U.S. 760 (1944)-all cases on which at least some of the
Rehnquist Court nominees were willing to provide firm opinions?
Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 93 (1987) [hereinafter
Kennedy Transcript];Nomination of David H. Souter to Be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. 63 (1990) [hereinafter Souter Transcript]; Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong. 188
(1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Transcript]; Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103rd Cong. 380 (1994) [hereinafter Breyer Transcript].

28
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tial in future cases and refused-twice-to provide an opinion about
29
that case. Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the case was even more
confounding. In discussing the relationship between Marbury and Ex
Parte McCardle (involving Congress's authority under the Exceptions
Clause to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction)," Justice Rehnquist was willing to agree that Marbury meant that the Supreme Court could not be stripped of jurisdiction over First Amendment questions s' but then invoked the privilege when asked about the
removal of the Court's jurisdiction over other constitutional ques32
tions. This type of variance between the Justices is difficult to explain in terms of a distinction between "settled" and "unsettled"
cases-Marbury was no more or less settled in 1986 when Justice Scalia
was confirmed than it was in 1994 when Justice Breyer was confirmed;
nor is the meaning of the Exceptions Clause more settled in regard
to First Amendment questions than it is in regard to Fifth, Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment questions.
This problem is even more apparent when we look beyond the list
of cases most frequently responded-to to the longer list of all named
cases to which the nominees gave opinions. The Rehnquist Court
nominees gave general opinions on 179 different cases and firm
opinions on 92 cases. They invoked the privilege to not respond in
regard to 134 cases. Within the larger pool of named cases there
were numerous inconsistencies between the nominees. Justice Breyer
invoked the privilege in regard to Sherbert v. Verner,33 which involved
the Free Exercise Clause, whereas Justice Thomas expressed sympathy with the case's holding and methodology.

4

Justices Souter and

Rehnquist were both asked directly whether they agreed with the ma-

29

Scalia Transcript, supra note 27, at 33, 83.

30

ExParteMcCardle, 73 U.S. 318 (1867).

31

Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on theJudiciary,99th Cong. 319 (1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist Transcript].
Id. at 187-89, 319-20, 349. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Thomas neither offered an

32

opinion about Marbury nor refused to do so on the grounds entailed in the privilege.
This does not mean they were not asked about the case, rather only that their response
did not fit any of the categories examined here. In most situations, that means the nomi-

nee offered a description rather than an opinion of the named case and the questioning
senator did not push for a more responsive answer.
33

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

34

Breyer Transcript, supra note 28, at 153 (stating that he should "exercise caution" as to
questions about Sherbert because they would likely be before the Supreme Court); Thomas
Transcript, supra note 27 at 136 (disagreeing with the Court's move away from Sherbert in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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jority or the dissent in Baker v. Carr.5 Justice Souter acknowledged
the dissent's persuasive power but nonetheless stated that he believed
the majority opinion was correct. 36 Justice Rehnquist, on the other
hand, invoked the privilege and did not answer the question. 37 Jus-

tice Souter and Justice Thomas likewise treated identical cases differently. Justice Thomas six times said he did not "quarrel" with the re3 8 an early
sult reached in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
privacy case, while Justice
Souter invoked the privilege to avoid giving any opinion on that very
case.3 9 Those Justices also differed in their approaches to a second
early privacy case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland.4 ° When asked about
that case, Justice Thomas twice expressed general agreement, while
Justice Souter again invoked the privilege.4'
The selectivity apparent in the records of individual Justices themselves is even more startling. Table 2 below illustrates how many
times each nominee responded to a named case in each of the indicated ways42:

35
36
37
38
39

40
41

42

369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding questions of legislative districting justiciable and thus opening the door to the "one person, one vote" rule, over a strong dissent by Justice Harlan).
Souter Transcript,supra note 28, at 304 (" [W] ithout underestimating the power of Uustice
Harlan's] argument ... ultimately I would have had to have rejected it.").
Rehnquist Transcript, supra note 31, at 363 ("If you ask me whether I subscribe to the
[Baker] principle now .... I do not think I can answer that.").
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Thomas Transcript,supra note 27, at 278-79, 336; Souter Transcript,supra note 28, at 57 (answering the question by saying that "without specifically affirming or denying the wisdom
of Eisenstadt... I would express it without getting myself into the position of endorsing
the specifics of the case[s].
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Thomas Transcript, supra note 27, at 130 (explaining that "I think-and I think the Supreme Court's rulings in the privacy area support-that the notion of family is one of the
most personal and private relationships that we have in our country" and noting that, had
he been aware that Moorewas explicitly criticized in a report issued by his department, he
would have "expressed [his] concerns" before finalizing the report); Souter Transcript, supra note 28, at 58 ("[W]ith respect to Moore..... I am going to ask you excuse me from
specifically endorsing the particular result.").
Note that because this project does not capture the number of times each nominee is
asked to provide an opinion about a named case, the information presented here should
not be used to compare the nominees' relative responsiveness. Rather, the information
should only be used to compare the individual nominee's willingness to address certain
cases but not others. This denominator figure-the number of times a nominee is asked
to provide opinions about cases-is necessary to make meaningful comparisons about the
relative responsiveness of nominees. For example, a nominee who provided five firm
opinions but was only asked for six could be considered more responsive than a nominee
who provided 30 firm opinions but was asked for 500. Capturing the correct denominator is difficult, however, because senators frequently structure their questions in such a
way so as to leave the nominee free to offer an opinion on a named case or not, as the
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TABLE 2
RESPONSE TYPES: INDIVIDUAL NOMINEES

Nominee

Stevens

# of Cases on
Which General
Opinion Was
Given
4

# of Cases on
Which Firm
Opinion Was
Given
1

# of Cases on
Which Privilege
Was Invoked
0

Rehnquist, CJ

10

3

13

O'Connor
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer

6
2
26
22
17
28
14

0
0
14
10
12
14
7

5
6
5
4
9
23
16

Plainly, the Rehnquist Court nominees were highly selective with
regard to when they would and would not offer opinions about previously decided Supreme Court cases.43 Once again, however, not all
of this selectivity can be explained by resort to a simple division between settled and unsettled cases. Although the quantity of the information represented in Table 2 makes it impractical to provide

43

nominee prefers. It is inaccurate in such situations to say that the nominee is refusing to
answer a question or is being truly non-responsive.
The information shown above in regard to Justice Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and, to a
lesser extent, Chief Justice Rehnquist could support the common assumption that there is
some sort of "Bork-effect" apparent in the nomination process: each of these nominees
faced fewer questions about constitutional cases than did the nominees, starting with Justice Kennedy, nominated after Robert Bork. What effect, if any, that the failed Bork
nomination had on subsequent nominations is far from a settled question, however. See,
e.g., Frank Guliuzza III et al., The Senate Judiciary Committee and Supreme Court Nominees:
Measuring the Dynamics of Confirmation Criteria,56 J. POL. 773 (1994) (arguing that confirmation criteria for post-Bork judicial nominees has not changed quantifiably or substantively). An alternative explanation for the difference in questioning of post-Bork nominees, particularly in regard to Justices O'Connor and Scalia, may be the extraordinarily
uncontentious nature of their appointments. This is discussed in Part IV.B infra. See also
Breyer Transcript, supra note 28, at 381 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (contending that nominees answer as many questions as they
think they have to in order to receive confirmation). Because their nominations ranked
so low on the likely controversy scale, these nominees were in the enviable position of being highly confirmable without saying much of anything.
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here the case names for each of the individual nominee's responses,
a few examples will illustrate the point. Justice Breyer, for example,
provided at least a generally favorable opinion about Lemon v. Kurtzman," but then invoked the privilege to avoid discussing Sherbert and
Employment Division v. Smith45-all cases involving the very unsettled
religion clauses of the First Amendment. 46 Justice Rehnquist, as
noted above, was willing to say that Marbury means the Supreme
Court cannot be stripped of jurisdiction to hear First Amendment
cases, but then invoked the privilege when asked about its application
in other constitutional cases. Justice Thomas, while famously refusing
to answer any questions about Roe, nonetheless did opine on some
cases involving very "unsettled" doctrines, including Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,47 Sherbert, and Thornburg v. Gingles. 8 In
short, while all of the nominees who were asked were willing to embrace Brown and unwilling to discuss Roe, the territory between these
two iconic cases was uncharted at best.
The point here is not to question the motivations or intentions of
the nominees themselves, or to understate the subtleties of the exchanges between the nominees and the senators. Even a casual reading of the transcripts evidences the seemingly unlimited number of
ways the senators can pose their questions and the ongoing efforts
made by the nominees in answering them to balance the senators'
desire for information with what the nominees' appear to see as a
genuine duty to not comment on certain cases. The point, rather, is
that the disparity in the nominees' actual responses undermines the
validity of the claim that the refusal to comment on certain cases is in
fact necessary to preservejudicial independence or impartiality. It is simply
difficult to understand why, in those terms, Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer can offer opinions of Marbury but Justice Scalia
cannot; why Justice Souter can tell us how he would have voted in
Baker v. Carr,but Justice Rehnquist must avoid doing so; or why Justice Breyer can discuss Lemon but not Sherbert.4
44
45

46
47

48
49

411 U.S. 192 (1973).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Breyer Transcript, supranote 28, at 153, 224.
379 U.S. 241 (1964). See Thomas Transcript, supra note 27, at 373-74 (expressing general
approval of the scope of congressional power under the Interstate Commerce Clause as
articulated in that case).
478 U.S. 30 (1986). Thomas Transcript,supra note 27, at 134,136, 446.
It may be that the principle being advanced by actual practice is that the nominee him or
herself is entitled to decide whether discussing a particular case threatens future impartiality. While such a principle may itself advance some aspect ofjudicial independence, it
is difficult to connect with the impartiality concerns actually articulated, particularly the
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Moreover, even if the nominees' distinction between settled and
unsettled cases were applied consistently, it is far from clear that the
distinction itself is supportable. As noted above, the basis of this concern, as most frequently explained by the nominees themselves, is
that opining on unsettled cases risks their future impartiality because
such cases raise issues likely to come before the Court in the future.
The difficulty with this position is that saying a case is settled is simply
not the same thing as saying that the case does not raise issues likely
to come before the Court in the future.50
This is true even of our most enduring opinions. Consider
Brown-surely among the most settled of our settled cases, and one
on which all of the nominees who were asked were willing to opine.
Brown rests on the finding that state-sanctioned discrimination on the
basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. While no litigant is
likely to ask the Court to overturn Brown anytime in the foreseeable
future, cases pushing the scope of that premise, such as the use of
race in public law school admissions, obviously are among the most
controversial faced by the Court today. Even the specific question
presented in Brown-the use of race in primary school student placements-has recently re-arisen on the Court's docket. 5' Surely such
issues are no less related to the central holding in Brown than issues of
abortion and sexual autonomy are to the central holding in Griswold
(protecting the right of married adults to use contraception). Indeed, that central holding of Griswold arguably is less likely to come
back before the Court than the precise prohibition on statesupported single race schooling struck down in Brown. Simply put,
both "settled" and "unsettled" cases often involve issues that will
themselves come before the Court in the future. The nominees' relative willingness to opine on settled cases while avoiding offering opin-

50

51

concern about the appearanceof impartiality, which presumably would be the same for
each Justice regardless of his or her subjective impressions of propriety.
Justice Scalia has pointed out this difficulty and used it to explain his refusal to opine
about even the most settled cases. See, e.g., Scalia Transcript,supra note 27, at 33, 83-84.
Justice Scalia's confirmation, however, was one of the least contested of those examined
here (see infra Part IV.B), which certainly made it easier for him to take this more consistent approach.
See, e.g., Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (June 4, 2007) (holding
that a school's use of race in its student assignment plan was not narrowly tailored so as to
achieve a compelling government interest); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 05-908 (June 4, 2007) (same).
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ions on unsettled ones thus does not appear justified by concerns
51
about their ability to be impartial in future cases.
IV. POSITIVE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
INDEPENDENCE OBJECTION

As shown above, concerns about the individual decision-making
independence or impartiality of the future Justices do not appear to
explain either the actual practice of the Rehnquist Court nominees,
or those nominees' efforts to treat settled cases differently than unsettled cases. This supports Post and Siegel's conclusion that perhaps
these concerns are not what is animating opposition to the type of
senatorial questioning endorsed in their proposal. Such opposition
could, however, be better grounded in concerns about the institutional independence of the Supreme Court itself.
As noted above, the essence of this objection is that vigorous questioning of Supreme Court nominees infringes upon the independence of the Court as a whole, allowing the Senate to impose its policy
preferences on the Court. Such questioning is seen as infusing the
majoritarianism of the elected branches of government into the purportedly counter-majoritarian Supreme Court, thereby interfering
with the ability of the Court to "do itsjob"-to interpret the Constitution strictly in accordance with the Justices' best understanding of
what the law requires, without that interpretation being shaped by
the policy preferences of the other branches. As discussed below,
the premise on which this objection rests-that this is in fact the Supreme Court's 'job"-is contestable. Even on its own terms, however,
this objection rests on dubious grounds, in that it does not explain
the nominees' efforts to distinguish settled from unsettled cases, and
it does not appear to be justified by what existing political science
scholarship tells us about when and why Supreme Court confirmations become "politicized" in this way.
A. "Settled" Versus "Unsettled" Cases
The institutional independence objection does not appear to justify the nominees' actual practice of responding to questions about

52

53

Post and Siegel's observation that sitting Justices are not considered insufficiently impartial despite the fact that they repeatedly hear cases in which issues are raised that they
themselves had addressed in prior cases of course also rebuts this claim; my findings here
merely supplement their work in that sense.
Carter, The ConfirmationMess, supra note 3, at 1193.
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some cases but not others or their efforts to distinguish their responses to questions about settled cases from their responses to questions about unsettled cases. If judicial independence requires that
the Supreme Court interpret the Constitution as it and it alone sees
fit, then requiring nominees to embrace even settled cases before being confirmed should be considered unacceptable. Indeed, allowing
nominees to affirm the holdings of settled cases on the grounds that they
are settled undercuts the very notion of judicial independence on
which the underlying objection purportedly rests, which necessarily
includes the freedom to overturn even the most sacrosanct case if the
Court believes, in its sole judgment, that doing so is constitutionally
required.
When viewed in this light, the practice of most of the Rehnquist
Court nominees of willingly providing opinions about canonical cases
such as Brown and Lochner, while simultaneously avoiding revealing
opinions about controversial cases such as Roe and Griswold, makes little sense, at least as a matter of judicial independence. If the institutional independence of the judiciary requires that the Supreme
Court be as free to overturn Brown as Roe, in accordance with its-and
only its-constitutional vision, then conditioning confirmations on
an affirmation of Brown hinders that independence as much as would
conditioning confirmations on endorsement of the "correct" (as seen
by the senators) result in Roe.54 After all, as Robert Nagel has noted,
"one reason for asking about a settled case is to ensure that it remains
settled. 5 5 Thus, acknowledging that it is acceptable for the Senate to
ensure judicial fidelity to any previously decided case (which current
practice seems to condone) belies the logic of the judicial independence objection itself, by necessarily accepting that it is appropriate for
the Senate to use Supreme Court confirmation hearings, at least to
some extent, to define the acceptable parameters of constitutional
meaning.56 Likewise, nominees who agree to answer questions about
cases on the basis that they are settled rather than unsettled are doing
exactly what the independence objectors object to: signaling to the

54

Professor Randy Barnett, arguing in response to the Post-Siegel proposal, has made this
point. Forcing nominees to endorse the established cannon, he argues, gives the Senate
just as much control over the Court as would forcing them to take a position in controversial cases. Randy E. Barnett, Clauses Not Cases, YALE L.J. (THE POCKET PART),Jan. 2006,
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/01/bamett.html. Justice Scalia also made this point repeatedly during his confirmation hearing. Scalia Transcript,supra note 27, at 33, 84-87.

55
56

Nagel, supra note 5, at 866 (emphasis added).
I argue in Part IV.C infra that perhaps the Senate should have exactly this role.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

(Vol. 10:2

Senate that the nominee sees the issue raised in the cases as settled and
has no intention of revisiting it.
B. The "Politicization"of the Supreme Court
Opponents of the type of senatorial questioning endorsed by Post
and Siegel also object that such questioning threatens the institutional independence of the Supreme Court by excessively politicizing
the confirmation process and thereby leading to an expectationperhaps even on the part of the Justices themselves-that their role is
to further the constitutional or political visions of the senators that
confirmed them rather than to develop and implement their own independent vision. The concern in relation to the Post-Siegel proposal is that allowing nominees to answer questions about how they
would have voted in previously decided Supreme Court casesparticularly highly controversial cases-would dramatically increase
the risk of this type of politicization of the Court. 5s This concern is
understandable: it is not unreasonable to suspect that a confirmation
process in which Supreme Court nominees readily supply opinions
about Brown will look very different than one in which they are expected to offer opinions about Roe. Drawing on the rich political science work in this area, however, I suggest that this concern may be
overstated.59
Political scientists have long studied the Supreme Court confirmation process. Their work illustrates that few Supreme Court nominations are controversial, and that those that are become so for highly
predictable reasons. Those reasons, however, do not appear to be re-

57

MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THEJUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 146
(2004).

58

Post and Siegel themselves acknowledge this possibility but accept it as either a necessary
evil or a potentially useful educative opportunity. Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 50-51.

59

While I do not develop the point here, it also is worth considering whether "the public"
has or needs unrealistic ideas about the allegedly apolitical nature of the Supreme Court.
See Terri Jennings Peretti, DoesJudicial Independence Exist?: The Lessons in Social Science Re-

search, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
121 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (critiquing the idea that Americans strongly believe in judicial independence or that judges are "impartial decision
makers guided by principle"); see also Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity,
Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 985, 1019-20 (1990) (finding little correlation between public support for the Supreme Court and the Bork hearing); Benjamin I.
Page, Comment: The Rejection of Bork Preserved the Court's Limited Popular Constituencies, 84
NW. U. L. REv. 1024, 1027-29 (1990) (showing that the politicization of the Robert Bork
nomination did not result in reduced public support for the Supreme Court); Rose, supra
note 8, at 929 (describing the Bork nomination as the "fig leaf" falling).
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lated to the types of questions asked or answered at the nominees'
confirmation hearings. Rather, the confirmation hearings become
contentious only when certain, and usually rare, conditions are present. Specifically, the political science work in this area shows that
nominations become contested when weak presidents nominate candidates who are perceived as unqualified or who are ideologically distant from the confirming Senate (or, in most cases, both); or when
the Supreme Court seat being filled is seen as a "swing" or otherwise
critical one.' The more of these factors that are present in a given
nomination environment, the more likely the nomination is to be
contested.6' If these factors are not present, however, the nomination
is highly unlikely to be contested, despite the obvious fact that at least
some of the confirming senators are likely to be deeply opposed to
the President's chosen nominee. In such cases, the senators in the
ideological minority in the Senate do not fight the nomination and
lose; they simply do notfight, presumably making the strategic choice to
expend their political capital elsewhere.
Charles Cameron, Albert Cover, and Jeffrey Segal have studied
this phenomena extensively and have built a model that predicts the
number of senatorial "no" votes a nominee will generate based on
three factors: the strength of the nominating president; the perceived qualification of the nominee; and the distance between the
ideology of the confirming Senate and the nominee's perceived ide-

60

LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT:

THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL

APPOINTMENTS 92-115 (2005); Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A NeoinstitutionalModel, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525

(1990) (modeling the number of senatorial "no" votes a Supreme Court nominee is likely
to receive based on the perceived qualifications of the nominee, the strength of the
nominating president, and the ideological distance between the nominee and the confirming Senate); P. S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, CriticalNominations, and the Senate
Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793 (1993) (discussing the relatively high failure rate of

"critical" or swing nominees who are perceived as likely to change the ideological balance
on the reconfigured Court); see also JOHN MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT

NOMINATIONS 4-5 (1995) (noting the high failure rate of Supreme Court appointments
made by unelected Presidents); WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 1, at 51-56 (discussing
the effect of presidential strength and inter-branch conflict on Supreme Court nominations).
61

Cameron, Cover & Segal, supra note 60, at 528; Ruckman, supra note 60, at 794.
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ology.

This model has proven quite robust in predicting the extent

of Senate opposition to recent Supreme Court nominees

63

TABLE 364

Nominee

Stevens

Presidential
Strength

Perceived
Qualifica-

Perceived
Ideology

Predicted
"No"

Actual
"No"

(Sen.

tion

(0 to 1) 66

Votes

Votes

Control)

(0 to 1)65

O'Connor

Weak (D)
Strong (R)

0.96
1

Rehnquist,

Strong (R)

0.40

Scalia

Strong (R)

Bork

Weak (D)

Kennedy

Weak (D)

0.89

0.37

0

0

Souter

Weak (D)

0.77

0.33

14

9

Thomas

Weak (D)

0.41

0.16

56

48

Ginsburg

Strong (D)

1

0.68

0

3

Breyer

Strong (D)

0.55

0.48

0

9

j

1

1

0.79

0.25
0.48

0
0

0
0

0.05

35

33

0.10

0

0

0

1

1

38

1

58

Consider this model in relation to the difference between Justice
Scalia's extraordinarily smooth confirmation and the contentious and
ultimately unsuccessful nomination of Robert Bork. These two
nominations, made just a year apart by the same President (President
62

63

The strength of the President is based on the President's year in office and whether the
President's party controls the Senate. The nominee's perceived qualifications and perceived ideology are based on editorials from major newspapers written at the time of the
nomination. Cameron, Cover & Segal, supranote 60.
Cameron, Cover, and Segal applied their model to all nominees since Earl Warren. In

65

almost all cases, the model proved to be highly accurate. The exceptions were nominations apparently tainted by race-related opposition (which the modelers acknowledged
the model fails to capture), Robert Bork (probably for reasons discussed in note 78 infra),
and Abe Fortas's elevation to Chief Justice (a nomination which may have suffered for
reasons similar to Robert Bork's, and which in all likelihood also was tainted by bigotry).
For a description of the model and its predictions, see Cameron, Cover & Segal, supra
note 60, at 532 (evaluating all nominees through Kennedy). See asoJEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ArTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 216
(2002) (presenting a similar model that evaluates Justices Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer
as well). For a discussion of the Fortas nomination, see Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups
and Supreme Court Appointments, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 935, 949-50 (1990).
The information in this table is taken from SEGAL & SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 63, at 216.
A score of I indicates the nominee is perceived as highly qualified.

66

A score of 1 indicates the nominee is perceived as liberal.

64

Jan. 2008]

I'M SORRY, I CANT ANSWER THAT

Reagan), are frequently held up as evidence of what some see as the
disastrous consequences of allowing senatorial questions to politicize
the confirmation process.67 Justice Scalia, who was asked very few difficult or "political" questions and answered even fewer, breezed
through the confirmation hearings and was approved by the Senate
by a 98 to 0 vote. 68 Robert Bork, in contrast, was asked-and answered-numerous difficult and probing questions. His hearing was
contentious and political in every sense of the word, and his nomination failed by a Senate vote of 42 to 58.69 This has led many commentators to conclude that the politicization of the Bork hearings resulted in the failure of his nomination. The political science work
discussed above, however, suggests that this conclusion confuses
cause and effect: perhaps the Bork nomination did not fail because it
became politicized, but rather it became politicized because the environment was already one in which the nomination was likely to fail,
thus presenting the relatively rare situation in which it was worthwhile
for the Senators to vigorously fight a Supreme Court nomination.
A closer look at the contextual environment of the Scalia and
Bork nominations supports this interpretation. While Justice Scalia
and Robert Bork were, at the time of their respective confirmation
hearings, perceived as roughly equivalent in terms of both their qualifications for the Court and their ideological inclinations,70 virtually
nothing else about the environment in which the nominations occurred was the same. Justice Scalia was nominated in June of 1986
and confirmed in September of that same year.7 The Republicans
held majority control of the Senate, President Reagan was in the second year of his second term, and his administration was not yet embroiled in what would become the Iran-Contra scandal.72 Under such

67

68

Martin Shapiro discusses this idea in the context of the influence of interest groups on
the confirmation process. See Shapiro, supra note 63 (arguing that special interest groups
have little effect on Supreme Court appointments).
LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM:

DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 290 (1994).

69

Id.

70

Scalia actually was perceived as slightly more conservative and slightly more qualified than
Bork. Cameron, Cover & Segal, supra note 60, at 530.

71

EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 68. For Justice Scalia's perceived qualifica-

tion score (which was the highest possible), see Cameron, Cover & Segal, supra note 60,
at 530.
72

See Symposium, Foreword, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Roles of Congress, the

President, and the Courts, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 1 (1988) (summarizing the political climate at the time of the Iran-Contra affair); John Corry, Hearings in Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1987, at C18 (reporting on the congressional hearings into the Iran-Contra affair).
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circumstances, the models developed in the political science work
discussed above predict that Justice Scalia would be easily confirmed,
as he was.3
One year later, when Robert Bork was nominated, things had
changed. President Reagan was approaching his final year in office
and was ineligible for reelection. The Iran-Contra hearings had been
playing on televisions across the country all summer, and President
Reagan's popularity numbers were at a four-year low.14 The Democratic Party had taken control of the Senate in the intervening midterm elections.75 Perhaps as importantly, Judge Bork would be replacing Justice Lewis Powell on the Supreme Court. Justice Powell at that
time was seen as the critical (or swing) vote on an evenly divided Supreme Court: Justices White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia were
seen as reliably conservative votes, while Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens were viewed as reliable liberals.7 6 Replacing
Justice Powell with Robert Bork was thus perceived as a move that
would have shifted the Court as a whole sharply to the right. Justice
Scalia's confirmation, in contrast, had no such undercurrent. Justice
Scalia was replacing the conservative Justice Rehnquist at the associate justice position, while Justice Rehnquist himself was replacing the
conservative Chief Justice Warren Burger.77 Under these quite different circumstances, it is perhaps less surprising that Justice Scalia
sailed through the confirmation process while Robert Bork sank. 8
Thinking of the dynamics of Supreme Court confirmation hearings in this type of contextual, environment-driven way has important
73

The model developed by Cameron, Cover, and Segal predicted that Scalia would be
unanimously confirmed. Cameron, Cover & Segal, supranote 60, at 526.

74

E.J. Dionne, Jr., Poll Shows Reagan Approval Rating at 4-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,
1987, at Al.

75

Paul Taylor, Senate to Have 55 Democrats; Party Gains in House, Loses 8 Governorships to the
GOP,WASH. POST, Nov. 6,1986, at Al.

76

EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 58, at 111 (stating that Justice Powell was considered the
Court's center).

77

Id.; see also EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supranote 68, at 280.

78

The Cameron-Cover-Segal model predicted that Robert Bork would receive a high number-38--of negative senatorial votes, but it did not predict that his nomination would
actually fail. Their model, however, does not take into account the "critical nominee"
work done later by P. S. Ruckman, Jr. Ruckman's work, which shows an astonishingly
high 42 percent failure rate for "critical nominees," specifically addresses the Cameron-

Cover-Segal model and claims that controlling for this higher failure rate among critical
nominees improves the predictably of that model. Ruckman, supra note 60, at 798, 802;
see also David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, JudicialSelection, Appointments Gridlock, and the

Nuclear Option, 15J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 81, 87 (2006) (suggesting that a nominee's potential to upset the ideological status quo is a significant factor behind opposition

in the nomination process).
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consequences when evaluating the likely effects of adopting the PostSiegel proposal. Obviously, the Senate is willing to use its power over
Supreme Court confirmations to derail the appointment of nominees
who are unpalatable to the Senate, either because of the nominee's
personal ideology or because of the position the nominee will occupy
on the reconfigured Court. However, the political science work discussed above indicates that the Senate only has the politicalpower (or
perhaps incentive) to do so when a certain cluster of factors-a weak
President, an unqualified nominee, an ideologically hostile Senate, or
a critical nomination-is present. If this work is correct, the political
dynamics of confirmation themselves ensure that, regardless of
whether the Post-Siegel proposal is adopted, politicized nominations
are likely to be the exception, not the rule.79
Of course, it is not impossible that adoption of the Post-Siegel
proposal could itself politicize more nominations by altering these
underlying political dynamics. For example, a minority party in the
Senate could see greater political value in fighting a nominee who is
forced to affirmatively state her approval (or disapproval) of Roe than
in fighting one who is merely suspected of having a particular opinion
on that case. s° Again, however, the actual practice of the Rehnquist
Court nominees shows that this may be unlikely.
Consider the nomination and confirmation of Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Ginsburg, like almost all the Rehnquist Court nominees, was81
grilled extensively about abortion at her confirmation hearings.
Eventually, in response to a series of questions about Roe and Casey,
Justice Ginsburg said this:
The decision whether or not to bear a child is central to a woman's life,
to her well-being and dignity. It is a decision she must make for herself.
When government controls that decision for her, she is bein treated as
less than a fully adult human responsible for her own choices.

This response seems as much an affirmation of the core holding
of Roe as any that would be given under the Post-Siegel proposal. Yet
it did not generate a storm of controversy, nor did it instigate a rebel-

79

80
81

82

Indeed, Cameron, Cover, and Segal pose their research question as an effort to determine why a majority of nominations remain essentially noncontroversial. Cameron,
Cover & Segal, supra note 60, at 526 (citing Songer, supranote 3).
See COMISKEY, supra note 57, at 146 (considering possible consequences of Supreme
Court judicial nominees' engaging in more candid testimony).
Justice Stevens, nominated and confirmed just two years after Roe v. Wade was decided,
was the only one of the Justices examined here not asked a single question about that
case.
Ginsburg Transcript,supra note 28, at 207 (statement ofJustice Ginsburg).
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lion of pro-life senators against her nomination: Justice Ginsburg was
confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 96 to 3.83 Why? Almost certainly
because of the underlying political dynamics of her confirmation:
she was appointed by a President in his first few years of office, 4 she
was perceived as highly qualified, and she was joining a court in
which her vote on abortion issues was unlikely to be decisive.8 6 While
less quantifiable, it also seems likely that the Republican senators
viewed her as more acceptable overall than other likely Clinton
nominations, and that they were hesitant to vote against what would
be only the second woman to sit on the High Court. These types of
political considerations seem unlikely to change merely because
nominees are expected to address abortion and other controversial
issues in a slightly different diction.87
This (tentative) conclusion is bolstered by a closer look at the type
of responses the questions proposed by Post and Siegel are likely to
generate. Post and Siegel are very careful to emphasize that the purpose of their proposal is to better inform the Senate regarding how a
nominee's abstract constitutional philosophies or interpretive preferences are likely to be operationalized in concrete cases. s As such,
they specifically advise senators and nominees that their questions
and answers about previously decided cases must be carefully phrased
to avoid the appearance that they are asking for or providing commitments to adjudicate future cases in particular ways. 9 Asking for or
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EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 68, at 290.
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Ginsburg was confirmed in June of 1993, less than one year after President Clinton was
elected to his first term in office.
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SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 63, at 205 (noting that Ginsburg received a qualifications
score of 1.00 out of 1.00 based on an analysis of newspaper editorials written about her
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during the confirmation process).
PlannedParenthood v. Casey had been decided the previous year (in June of 1992). That
case made it clear that the Court, as comprised, contained five Justices-Justices Black-

mun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-who were unwilling to overturn the cen-
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tral holding in Roe. Because Justice Ginsburg was a replacement for Justice Byron White,
her vote was not critical on that issue.
Which is not to say that certain nominees confirmed in compliance with the Post-Siegel
proposal will not become embroiled in controversies about particular cases-of course
they will. As noted above, some nominations have always been more controversial than

others, and that is also unlikely to change merely because the Post-Siegel proposal is
88
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adopted. The point is that those nominations were going to be controversial regardless.
Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 48.

Id. (noting that Senators should phrase their questions in such a way as to understand
where the nominee currently stands on constitutional questions).
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receiving
such commitments would, Post and Siegel assume, be im90
proper.

The likely result of this caution is that nominees following the
Post-Siegel approach will carefully couch their answers in terms of the
facts presented in the case being discussed, while repeatedly emphasizing that facts and circumstances change, and that they will of
course keep an open mind in future cases. Thus, rather than saying
simply, "Yes, I believe Roe was properly decided and would have voted
with the majority in that case," a nominee operating under the PostSiegel approach would be more likely to say something like this:
I am inclined to think I would have voted with the majority in Roe
v. Wade, but that of course should not be taken as indicating how I
would vote in a future case raising similar issues. Because of Roe,
we now have years of experience with the legal and social consequences of legalized abortion; we have reams of scholarship examining the original understanding of the constitutional provisions
on which that decision was based; we have a much richer understanding of the values at stake and of people's attachment to those
values; and we have a deeper appreciation for our own capacity to
adjudicate such cases and the extent to which society structures its
expectations around such decisions. Any new case, therefore, obviously would have to be evaluated on its own terms, in light of
these and other changed circumstances.
Whatever the value of such an answer may be to the senators, it seems
unlikely that such heavily qualified responses, perfectly appropriate
under the Post-Siegel proposal, could serve as the rallying cry necessary to change the underlying political dynamics of the confirmation
process discussed above. 9'
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Id. ("All agree that the judiciary should be independent and that, if confirmed, a nominee should be free to make legal judgments in ways that escape congressional control.").
Consider also a second example. Potter Stewart, nominated in 1959, was pressed hard by
Southern senators for an opinion on Brown v. Board of Education. He eventually provided
one, saying, "I would not like you to vote for me on the assumption ... that I am dedicated to the cause of overturning that decision. Because I am not." Brown was surely as
hotly contested in 1959 as Roe is today. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURTJUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY

89 (1985) (noting also that Stewart's confirmation was briefly delayed by a group of
Southern senators who were troubled by Stewart's statement on Brown). Yet Stewart, like
Justice Ginsburg, was confirmed, with just 17 negative votes. EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH &
WALKER, supra note 68, at 289. Scenarios such as this-not just the looming shadow of
Roe--must inform these discussions.
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C. InstitutionalIndependence and Positive Legal Scholarship
The analysis presented to this point supports the Post-Siegel proposal by illustrating that the refusal of Supreme Court nominees to
opine on previously decided cases does not appear in practice to be
based on any consistently applied principle regarding judicial independence or impartiality. It also illustrates that there is less difference between the Post-Siegel proposal and current practice than is
perhaps assumed, and that adopting the Post-Siegel plan seems
unlikely to significantly increase the risk of excessive politicization of
the judiciary. The discussion so far has not, however, directly addressed the normative argument presented by opponents of vigorous
senatorial questioning; namely, that allowing Supreme Court nominees to answer questions about previously decided cases does in fact
threaten the institutional independence of the Supreme Court and
simply should not be permitted. In this view, current practice stands
as disturbing evidence of the scope of the problem, not a reason to
92
be less skeptical of permitting more such questions in the future.
This part of the Article addresses that objection. It is beyond the
scope of this project to fully engage in this ongoing normative debate, and I do not attempt to do so here. Rather, my purpose is to
explore the role that existing positive legal scholarship can play in informing that debate and in evaluating its relevance to the Post-Siegel
proposal.
As several scholars have noted, the debate about the institutional
independence of the Supreme Court often seems hopelessly disconnected from the insights empirical research has generated about the
actual operation of the Court.9 3 Most obvious is the observation that
if an independent judiciary requires a nomination and confirmation
process divorced from senatorial (or presidential) 94 consideration of
the likely voting behavior of the proposed Justice, then we do not,
and probably have never had, an independent judiciary. 95 This alone
92
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Note this was in part Randy Barnett's point. See Barnett, supra note 54, at 66.
See, e.g., Peretti, supra note 59, at 103, 121 (criticizing the paucity of empirical research
used to inform the debate on judicial independence).
Lively, supra note 8.
MALTESE, supra note 60, at 33 (showing influence of political and policy preferences on
Supreme Court nominations extending back to and continuing from George Washington's failed nomination of John Rutledge to be ChiefJustice, noting that more than one
in four Supreme Court nominations made in the nineteenth century failed, mostly for
reasons unrelated to a lack of qualifications, and citing a letter from Thomas Jefferson to
then-President James Madison urging Madison to use his Supreme Court appointments
to ensure a Republican majority on that Court); see also HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,JUSTICES AND
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should encourage a serious rethinking of how we view the relationship between judicial independence and the Supreme Court confirmation process. I propose, however, that the problem lies deeper, in
how we think of the role of the Supreme Court itself.
Much of the criticism of vigorous questioning of Supreme Court
nominees rests on the perception that such questioning intrudes on
the future Justices' ability to perform what these critics believe is the
essential role of the Supreme Court: to interpret and apply the Constitution according to uniquely legal modes of reasoning, free from
the majoritarian influences felt by the other branches of government.96 It is, in this view, emphatically the duty of Justices of the Supreme Court to interpret the constitution as they-not the President
who nominated them, the Senate that confirmed them, or the public
to whom those actors answer-think best.97 Allowing the Senate to
use a nominee's endorsement or rejection of particular cases as a
"litmus test" in the confirmation process would, in this view, necessarily interfere with that duty by allowing the Senate to impose its own
view of constitutional meaning on the Supreme Court. It would, as
Professor Carter has contended, hand judicial
review over to the very
98
check.
to
intended
was
it
majoritarianism
The difficulty with this from the perspective of a positive legal
scholar is that this vision of the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian body developing constitutional rules in accordance with
uniquely legal modes of reasoning is-as Professor Carter pointedly
acknowledges9-almost entirely repudiated by what we know about
how the Supreme Court actually functions. As several scholars have
exhaustively demonstrated, the Supreme Court has, throughout our
history, rarely behaved in a seriously countermajoritarian way.' ° PoPRESIDENTS (3d ed. 1992) (providing a historical account of the reasons for Justices' appointments); TERRI JENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 85 (1999) (dis-

96

cussing the persuasive influence of ideological and political preferences in Presidents'
Supreme Court nominations); Lively, supra note 8 (tracing the history of partisan and
policy-based struggles over the Supreme Court); Peretti, supra note 59, at 106-09 (summarizing extensive literature tracing the role of partisanship and policy preferences in
senatorial consideration of Supreme Court nominations).
Carter, The Confirmation Mess Revisited, supra note 4, at 962-63; see also D.W. NEUBAUER,
JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1997) (discussing a model of the U.S. court system as one that is insulated from public influence).
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Carter, The Confirmation Mess, supranote 3, at 1193.
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Id.
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Id. at 1190-91, 1201.
For the seminal argument to this effect, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 279-95 (1957). More
recent work includes GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
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litical science scholarship, in turn, provides ample evidence that Supreme Court decision making does not rest on purely legal (even if
disputed) modes of reasoning. Rather, this scholarship shows that
Supreme Court Justices' non-legal political preferences play, at a
minimum, some role in how they exercise the discretion left to them
by interpretive methodologies and other legal rules."'
While it is possible that concern about judicial independence is
grounded in a desire to protect a constitutional function that our
Court has rarely, if ever, in fact played, it seems at least somewhat
unlikely that such long-lasting concerns would grow from such infertile soil. Taking the positive and political science scholarship in this
area seriously thus requires us to entertain the possibility that judicial
independence, at least in our system, is serving some function other
than that of isolating the Supreme Court in order to ensure that its
Justices are able to exercise their duty to use apolitical modes of legal
reasoning to find and apply countermajoritarian constitutional rules.
Positive legal scholars are beginning to work toward a better understanding of the function of judicial independence within our system by offering alternative explanations of the role the Supreme
Court itself actually plays in that system. 0 2 The key point is that this
scholarship invites us to rethink the very purpose of the confirmation
hearing process: If the confirmation process need not be structured
to protect an apparently inaccurate view of the institutional function
of the Supreme Court, how should that process be structured?
The Post-Siegel proposal offers a useful framework through which
to consider that question. 01 3 By stripping away the image of the Supreme Court as a necessarily countermajoritarian institution, we can
envision the confirmation hearing process as an appropriate, longterm, democratic check on the Court: a mechanism through which
our society, through its elected representatives, marks for the Court
the boundary at which the legally permissible meets the politically

ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) and Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1993).
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SEGAL & SPAETH,

supra note 63; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,

DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 155 (2002) (arguing that all known methods of constitutional interpretation leave ample room for the exercise ofjudicial discretion).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Importanceof Being Positive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1295 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court's unique
role is to facilitate a national dialogue about constitutional meaning).
For a thorough examination of the interconnectedness ofjudicial independence and judicial accountability, see JudicialIndependence at the Crossroads: An InterdisciplinaryApproach

(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
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unacceptable. 104 Beyond that point, Justices are told, you may not go.
Probing confirmation questions and answers such as those proposed
by Post and Siegel thus become one way in which our legal system
identifies and conveys our society's understanding of the substantive
commitments-the constitutional commitments-it expects the Supreme Court to respect. Confirmation hearings in this scenario are
not sterile exercises that must be conducted with great restraint in
order to protect a judicial function that may not exist. Rather, they
become exactly what Justice Scalia once bemoaned that they were
turning into: mini-constitutional conventions, rich and lively debates
through which the deepest values
of our society are gradually ab05
sorbed into its fundamental law.

The question of whether our confirmation hearings do in fact play
this role is worthy of further exploration, as is the question of how, if
that role is deemed desirable, the confirmation process might be better designed to enhance its effectiveness.' 6 The salient point, for present purposes, is merely that this type of work has the potential to
help frame the discussion about judicial independence and senate
confirmation hearings in a way that could be both normatively desirable and consistent with what positive legal scholarship teaches us
about how the Supreme Court actually works.
V. CONCLUSION

The current confusion about the appropriate scope of senatorial
questioning in Supreme Court confirmation hearings is unfortunate.
It renders the senators tentative and hesitant in their questioning,
104
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See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, DependentJudiciary: InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974-76 (2002) (noting that judicial independence in our system is balanced with judicial accountability by placing relatively
unaccountable judges within a highly politically accountable judiciary).
See COMISKEY, supra note 57, at 27. This does not, as Professor Carter fears, merge the
judicial function into the political function, for the simple reason that Supreme Court
nominations do not occur all at one time; they are staggered, usually at two- to three-year
intervals. This staggering means that, at any given point in time, the Court as a whole will
be comprised of Justices nominated by different presidents and confirmed by different
Senates, all with shifting partisan preferences and policy priorities. This helps to ensure
that the decisions of the Court do indeed reflect the long-term constitutional commitments of the people rather than the short-term passions of the moment. Friedman, supra
note 102, at 1274-75.
I hope to expand the dataset on which this Article is developed to examine this question
by, among other things, comparing statements made by nominees at their confirmation
hearings with their subsequent performance on the bench. Using empirical and positive
scholarship in this way to build better institutional designs may be one area in which such
scholarship can have the most impact. See Friedman, supra note 100.
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undermining their ability to confidently play a meaningful constitutional role in the confirmation process. 07 As Justice Thomas, speaking from a different perspective, has noted, it also encourages nominees to be less than forthcoming about their true positions.0 8 The
positive legal scholarship examined here illustrates that the PostSiegel proposal, if embraced by senators and nominees, has the potential to bring some much needed clarity to the confirmation process, to do so without posing a significant threat to either the individual decision-making independence of Supreme Court Justices or to
the institutional independence of the Supreme Court, and to do so in
a way that is compatible with a realistic vision of the role the Supreme
Court plays in our governing scheme. As such, the proposal clearly
warrants further consideration.
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Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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JOHN C. DANFORTH,

(1994).
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